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Collaborations between for-profit drug companies and not-for-profit disease 
advocacy groups have risen in recent years in an effort to find cures for orphan 
diseases. These unique and beneficial collaborations are a result of disease 
advocacy groups assuming a more active role in drug development through the use 
of “venture philanthropy,” which employs concepts and techniques from venture 
capitalism and applies them to achieving philanthropic goals. While these 
collaborations have found remarkable success, such as the discovery of the first 
known cure for cystic fibrosis in 2012, venture philanthropy for drug discovery 
presents numerous legal and social challenges. This Article examines the challenges 
presented by these novel partnerships and suggests ways that changes in the law or 
regulations can promote these partnerships without undue harm to the overall goal 
of advancing research toward cures for patients. The Article further addresses the 
issue of when a new product is discovered, if and how disease advocacy groups 
should control drug pricing and patient access to the new drug.  
I.  INTRODUCTION
“The unique and mutually beneficial partnership that led to the approval 
of Kalydeco serves as a great model for what companies and patient 
groups can achieve if they collaborate on drug development.”
1
In January 2012, the FDA approved a new breakthrough drug for cystic fibrosis: 
Kalydeco (ivacaftor), the first available drug that treats the cause and not just the 
symptoms of cystic fibrosis.2 Cystic fibrosis is the most common fatal genetic 
disease among Caucasians, affecting approximately 30,000 people in the United 
States.3 The average life expectancy for people with the disease is thirty-eight years.4
                                                          
1 Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA approves Kalydeco to treat rare form 
of cystic fibrosis (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnounce 
ments/ucm289633.htm. 
2 Id. Cystic fibrosis causes abnormally thick mucus in the lungs and digestive tract. Id. 
The drug Kalydeco (ivacaftor) is for the treatment of a rare form of cystic fibrosis in patients 
ages 6 years and older who have the specific G551D mutation in the Cystic Fibrosis 
Transmembrane Regulator (CFTR) gene. Id. Of the approximately 30,000 people affected 
with the disease in the United States, roughly 1,200 people (4%) are believed to carry the 
G551D mutation. Id. While Kalydeco only treats a relatively rare form of cystic fibrosis, it 
may lead to additional drugs that treat people impacted by other forms of cystic fibrosis. FDA 
Approves Kalydeco (VX-770) — First Drug That Targets the Underlying Cause of Cystic 
Fibrosis, CYSTIC FIBROSIS FOUND. (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.cff.org/aboutCFFoundation/ 
NewsEvents/2012NewsArchive/1-31-FDA-Approves-Kalydeco.cfm.  
3 See Press Release, supra note 1. 
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While the gene that causes cystic fibrosis was discovered in 1989,5 it has taken over 
two decades and a unique collaboration to find a cure.6
The collaboration that gave rise to this drug discovery involved a partnership 
between a for-profit bioscience company, Vertex Pharmaceuticals, and a national 
nonprofit organization, the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation.7 The impetus for this 
collaboration was simple: “the disease is prevalent enough to cause widespread pain, 
but too small for profit-minded bioscience companies to risk massive resources in 
pursuit of a cure.”8 Thus, the Foundation invested over $45 million into Vertex in 
2000 for research and development of a drug for the disease.9 This was “the largest 
grant of its kind by a nonprofit disease group.”10 By 2012, the Foundation had 
awarded Vertex over $75 million in funding11 and has invested $260 million in drug 
development since the mid-1990s.12  
When the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation made its initial investment, such “venture 
philanthropy” was uncommon.13 As the chief executive, Robert Beall, told one 
reporter, it was “the biggest gamble I ever made.”14 Today, however, such 
partnerships are becoming more common.15 In 2008, U.S. disease foundations 
                                                          
4 Bruce C. Marshall & Leslie Hazle, PATIENT REGISTRY ANNUAL DATA REPORT 4 (2010),
www.cff.org/UploadedFiles/LivingWithCF/CareCenterNetwork/PatientRegistry/2010-Patient-
Registry-Report.pdf. 
5 Melissa A. Ashlock & Eric R. Olson, Therapeutics Development for Cystic Fibrosis: A 
Successful Model for a Multisystem Genetic Disease, 62 ANNU. REV. MED. 108-09 (2011). 
6 Id. at 107-25. 
7 Id.; see also Brian McGrory, Driven by Loss, Father Inspires Tireless Pursuit of a Cure,
BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 9, 2012, http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2012 
/02/09/joeys_long_legacy/.
8 See McGrory, supra note 7.  
9 Matthew Perrone, Kalydeco, Drug That Treats Root Cause of Cystic Fibrosis, Approved 
by FDA, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/31/k 
alydeco-cystic-fibrosis-cause-drug_n_1244218.html. 
10 Id. 
11 Id.
12 Richard Haugh, Disease Foundations Prime the Drug Pump, HOSP. & HEALTH 
NETWORKS MAG. (Feb. 2012), http://www.hhnmag.com/hhnmag/jsp/articledisplay.js 
p?dcrpath=HHNMAG/Article/data/02FEB2010/1002HHN_Inbox_pharmaceutical&domain=
HHNMAG.
13 See Ashlock & Olson, supra note 5, at 116 (stating that the collaboration between 
Vertex Pharmaceuticals and the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation “pioneered” the venture 
philanthropy business model). 
14 See McGrory, supra note 7.  
15 Sarah Hanson, Lori Nadig & Bruce Altevogt, VENTURE PHILANTHROPY STRATEGIES TO 
SUPPORT TRANSLATIONAL RESEARCH 2 (2009), www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12558 
&p=2. 
288 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol.:26:285 
invested approximately $90 million into for-profit companies for drug 
development.16 This was thirteen times more than was invested in 2000.17
The objective of this Article is to examine the benefits and challenges of these 
novel partnerships and suggest ways that changes in the laws or regulations can 
promote these partnerships without undue harm to the goal of advancing research for 
cures for patients. To achieve this objective, Part I describes how partnerships 
between disease advocacy groups and for-profit companies have evolved and the 
benefits of the new venture philanthropy business model. Part II examines the legal 
and social issues of the venture philanthropy model. Part III then proposes various 
changes to laws and regulations that could help incentivize these partnerships. 
Finally, Part IV addresses the issue of when a new product is discovered, if and how 
disease advocacy groups should control drug pricing and patient access to the new 
drug.  
II.  PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN DISEASE ADVOCACY GROUPS AND ACADEMIC AND 
COMMERCIAL RESEARCHERS: THE RISE OF VENTURE PHILANTHROPY
“I’ve seen all the elements of drug development from NIH to industry to 
academia to being a patient myself . . . nobody has bad intent, it’s just an 
old and broken system that really needs to be updated.”
18
  
A.  Disease Advocacy Group Funding for “De Novo” and “Repurposed” Drug 
Research 
Voluntary health organizations, including disease advocacy groups,19 have a 
“long-standing history of providing support to those suffering from disease.”20 The 
support provided includes offering care, educational resources, participant 
recruitment for clinical studies, and funding disease research to develop cures and 
novel therapies for particular diseases.21 In terms of novel therapies, these groups 
                                                          
16 U.S. Disease Foundation Investment in Biopharmaceutical Industry up 20% in 2008, 
CTR.WATCH NEWS ONLINE (Sept. 5, 2008), http://www.centerwatch.com/news-online/article/1 
66/us-disease-foundation-investment-in-biopharmaceutical-industry-up-20-in-2008. 
17 Id.
18 Venture Philanthropy on the Rise, 14:8 CENTERWATCH 7 (2007), http://www.themmrf. 
org/assets/about-the-mmrf/powerful-news/venture-philanthropy-on-the.pdf. 
19 Voluntary health organizations include nonprofit charitable organizations, disease 
advocacy groups, and foundations. See Hanson, supra note 15, at 1. 
20 See Hanson, supra note 15, at 1. 
21 See Hanson, supra note 15, at 1; see Sharon F. Terry et al., Advocacy Groups as 
Research Organizations: the PXE International Example, 8 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 157, 
164 (2007); David C. Landy et al., How Disease Advocacy Organizations Participate in 
Clinical Research: A Survey of Genetic Organizations, 14 GENETICS IN MED. 223, 227 (2012).  
A review of journal articles published in 2004 and 2005 reporting on clinical research on 
genetic diseases found that 33% of all articles that included a statement regarding research 
support acknowledged disease-advocacy group funding. Richard R. Sharp & David C. Landy, 
The Financing of Clinical Genetics Research by Disease Advocacy Organizations: A Review 
of Funding Disclosures in Biomedical Journals, 152A AM. J. MED. GENETICS PART A 3051, 
3051 (2010).  
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have been concerned both with the discovery of new drugs, like Kalydeco,22 as well 
as finding new uses for old drugs (known as “repurposing”).23  
“De novo” drug development is expensive and time consuming.24 Prior to being 
marketed in the United States, each drug must undergo a detailed U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) review process. 25 The drug discovery process involves 
the following steps: 1) basic research to identify the underlying causes or genetic 
mechanism; 2) screening for compounds that show activity with the disease; 3) 
optimization of compounds to determine whether a drug candidate might be safe and 
effective if taken by humans; 4) identification of the best drug candidate and filing 
an IND application with the FDA; 5) clinical trials; and 6) post-marketing studies to 
monitor product safety.26 With this process, a new drug takes ten to fifteen years to 
develop and $1 billion to $4 billion to bring the drug to the market.27 For every 
5,000-10,000 compounds that enter the drug discovery process, only one will be 
approved.28  
In contrast, developing repurposed drugs can cost half that of “de novo” drugs 
because clinical research has already determined the toxicology, safety, dosage, and 
side effects of the drugs.29 The federal government also provides incentives for 
companies to focus on drug repositioning, especially in the context of rare or 
neglected diseases.30 For example, the FDA, through the Orphan Drug Act, provides 
some market exclusivity to companies that invest in repurposing drugs for the 
treatment for rare diseases, even if the patent term on the drug has expired.31 The 
National Chemical Genome Center is also developing a library of approved drugs to 
in order for them to be more easily screened for additional uses.32 These incentives 
have caused many biotechnology companies to increase their efforts in drug 
                                                          
22 See Press Release, supra note 1. 
23 Ramaiah Muthyala, Orphan/rare Drug Discovery Through Drug Repositioning, 8 DRUG 
DISCOVERY TODAY: THERAPEUTIC STRATEGIES 71, 71 (2011).  
24 See Garret A. FitzGerald, Re-engineering Drug Discovery and Development, 17 
LEONARD DAVIS INST. OF HEALTH ECON. 1, 1 (2011).
25 The U.S. Food and Drug Administration is the federal agency responsible for protecting 
and promoting public health through the regulation and supervision of food and drug safety. 
About FDA, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 2012), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transpar 
ency/Basics/ucm192695.htm. All drugs are required to receive FDA approval before being 
placed on the market. 21 U.S.C. §355(a) (2011). 
26 Paul T. Nyffeler, The Safe Harbor of 35 U.S.C. §271(e)(1): The End of Enforceable 
Biotechnology Patents in Drug Discovery, 41 U. RICH. L.REV. 1025, 1041-44 (2007). 
27 See FitzGerald, supra note 24, at 1.  
28 See FitzGerald, supra note 24, at 1.
29 Marilyn J. Field & Thomas F. Boat, RARE DISEASES AND ORPHAN PRODUCTS 172 (2011), 
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12953;. Muthyala, supra note 23, at 71-76. 
30 See FIELD & BOAT, supra note 29, at 172; Muthyala, supra note 23, at 71-76. 
31 See FIELD & BOAT, supra note 29, at 172. 
32 See FIELD & BOAT, supra note 29, at 172.  
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repositioning, especially when business partnerships are available to create market 
value in the compounds.33
B.  The Shift from the Charitable Granting to Venture Philanthropy  
Traditionally, disease advocacy groups provided research funding in the form of 
charitable grants to academic or nonprofit researchers to support basic research on a 
disease.34 However, many disease advocacy groups began feeling as though the 
standard grant approach was not yielding sufficient results.35 Thus, in the late 
1990’s, disease advocacy groups began assuming a more active role in drug 
development through the use of venture philanthropy.36  
In its most basic form, venture philanthropy employs concepts and techniques 
from venture capitalism and applies them to achieving philanthropic goals.37 Venture 
capitalism is a mechanism for which money from various third-party sources are 
invested into typically high-risk areas.38 As part of their investment strategy, venture 
capitalists utilize various techniques, including adopting performance measures, 
investing larger amounts of money in chosen organizations, partnering closely with 
the organizations to provide assistance and produce results, and developing an exit 
strategy.39 Unlike traditional charitable grants, the venture philanthropy model treats 
funding like an investment, with its corresponding expectations of return, operating 
efficiencies, and management oversight.40  
Drug advocacy groups are using venture philanthropy to accelerate drug 
discovery research for new therapies and cures for diseases.41 Under the venture 
philanthropy model, disease advocacy groups are funding not only basic research in 
academia, but also translational research and early stages of drug development.42
                                                          
33 See Muthyala, supra note 23, at 71-76. 
34 See FIELD & BOAT, supra note 29, at 168 (“advocacy groups have traditionally provided 
support for basic discovery research”). 
35 See FIELD & BOAT, supra note 29, at 168. 
36  Jessica Potts, Venture Philanthropy: A Case Study of Three Nonprofit Organizations 
(Oct. 1, 2011) (unpublished Masters thesis, Kennesaw State University) (on file with Kenne- 
saw State University Library).  
37 Venture Philanthropy, WIKIPEDIA (Feb. 2012), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venture 
_philanthropy. 
38 Christine W. Letts et al., Virtuous Capital: What Foundations Can Learn from Venture 
Capitalists, 75 HARV. BUS. REV. 36, 3 (1997), http://www.wheatridge.org/wp-content/uploads 
/2012/03/Virtuous_Capital_HB.pdf. 
39 Id. 
40 Bruce Sievers, IF PIGS HAD WINGS: THE APPEALS AND LIMITS OF VENTURE 
PHILANTHROPY 2 (2001), http://cpnl.georgetown.edu/doc_pool/Nielsen0103Sievers.pdf. 
41 About Us, ALZHEIMER’S DRUG DISCOVERY FOUND. (Feb. 2012), http://www.alzdisco 
very.org/index.php/about/learn-about-venture-philanthropy-faqs. 
42 See HANSON, supra note 15.  
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This has led them to partner with private sector bioscience companies.43 While 
venture philanthropy business models vary among disease advocacy groups,44 most 
models have the following key characteristics: fast and flexible grant-making, long-
term funding of “high risk, high reward” projects that complement NIH funding, 
high levels of disclosure and accountability with transparent performance metrics, 
interactive approach to connecting donors with beneficiaries, applying good 
governance and management practices, and taking an active, rather than passive 
facilitator role.45 The Cystic Fibrosis Foundation is an excellent example of how one 
company came to adopt the venture philanthropy business model.46  
C.  Benefits of the New Model: Removing Risk and Closing Funding Gaps 
Venture philanthropy is used to fill funding gaps that arise from drug 
development’s economic risks. As described above, drug development entails 
considerable time and expense.47 Additionally, of approved drugs, only three of 
every ten compounds earn a profit, irrespective of therapeutic area, and only one of 
ten becomes a “blockbuster” drug that earns enough profits to fund further 
                                                          
43 Id. (The drug advocacy groups’ goal is to use “funding and strategic leadership to help 
draw discoveries out of the academic sector and into the hands of parties with the ability to 
commercialize new therapies.”).  
44 See Gambrill, supra note 18, at 9-14 (generally describing the different venture 
philanthropy models employed by the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, Multiple Myeloma 
Research Foundation, Muscular Dystrophy Association, Juvenile Diabetes Research 
Foundation, and Michael J. Fox Foundation for Parkinson’s Research).  
45 JOANNE CHANG, BEST PRACTICES FOR VENTURE PHILANTHROPY COLLABORATIONS 
BETWEEN DISEASE-FOCUSED FOUNDATIONS AND FOR-PROFIT LIFE SCIENCES COMPANIES 10-12 
(2010) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Library). 
46 The Cystic Fibrosis Foundation is considered a pioneer in developing a successful 
venture philanthropy business model as a way to drive drug development for rare diseases. 
Media FAQs, CYSTIC FIBROSIS FOUND (Feb. 2012), http://www.cff.org/aboutCFFoundation/P 
ressRoom/MediaFAQs/; see also Ashlock & Olson, supra note 5, at 116. Prior to 2000, the 
Foundation focused its drug discovery efforts by awarding small grants to academic 
researchers. “Cystic Fibrosis Foundation,” ANSWERS.COM (Feb. 2012), www.answers.com/to 
pic/cystic-fibrosis-foundation. This support led to the discovery of the cystic fibrosis gene in 
1989, which could be used to identify the cause and treatment of the disease. Id. By 1997, the 
FDA had approved two drugs for treating the symptoms of cystic fibrosis; however, the 
progress was not as great as the foundation had hoped. Id. Around the same time, the 
Foundation also experienced a successful partnership with the for-profit bioscience company, 
PathoGenesis, which resulted in a top-selling drug product. Id. These experiences led the 
Foundation to adopt a new business model that encouraged private companies to conduct 
cystic fibrosis drug discovery research. Id. By 2001, the Foundation had given money to 
eleven for-profit companies. Id. By 2003, there were around two dozen cystic fibrosis 
therapies in development. Id. 
47 Venture Philanthropy, WIKIPEDIA (Feb. 2012), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ventur 
e_philanthropy. 
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research.48 Thus, to help “de-risk” drug development and fill funding gaps, disease 
advocacy groups direct money to bioscience companies and translational research.49
First, disease advocacy groups often fund bioscience companies. Traditionally, 
bioscience companies have relied on funding from venture capital firms.50 From 
1995 to 2005, venture capital investments in the U.S. biotechnology industry 
increased from $830 million to almost $4 billion and from 10 to 17 percent of all 
U.S. venture capital investments.51 However, a study conducted by the National 
Venture Capital Association in 2011 suggests that venture capital is becoming 
increasingly unavailable for U.S. bioscience companies. 52 The survey found that 
39% of U.S. venture capital firms decreased investments in life science companies 
between 2008 and 2011. 53 A similar number of firms expected to further decrease 
investments by as much as 30% over the next three years.54 The primary reason cited 
for the decline was the increased risk from perceived unpredictability of the FDA 
process.55  
Second, disease advocacy groups also fund translational research. “Translational 
research is a broad term used to describe the process of translating the basic biology 
of a disease into [actual] therapeutics.”56 This journey from academia to clinical 
trials has been coined the “‘Valley of Death,’ because many therapeutic strategies 
start the journey but few finish.”57  
Because of the risk, bioscience companies looking for programs to support are 
generally not interested in funding risky early-stage drug candidates.58 When 
bioscience companies, and their venture capitalist backers, are willing to invest in 
early-stage research, they are more likely to focus on potential “blockbuster” drugs, 
at the expense of smaller more challenging diseases.59 Thus, without public funding 
or investment to help minimize the risk, biotechnology companies generally do not 
                                                          
48 Drug Discovery Process, ALZHEIMER’S DRUG DISCOVERY FOUND. (Feb 2012), http://ww 
w.alzdiscovery.org/index.php/alzheimers-disease/hope-through-drugs/drug-discovery-process. 
49 Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, U.S. Medical Innovation at Risk: Fewer 
New Companies and Therapies Receiving Funding, Says Report (Oct. 6, 2011), http://sg.fin 
ance.yahoo.com/news/U-S-Medical-Innovation-Risk-iw-1103747796.html. 
50 Id.  
51 Ke Chen et al., How Much Does History Matter? An Analysis of the Geographic 
Distribution of Venture Capital Investment in the U.S. Biotechnology Industry, 6 INDUS.
GEOGRAPHER 31, 33 (2009). 
52 Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, supra note 49. 
53 Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, supra note 49. 
54 Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, supra note 49. 
55 Press Release, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, supra note 49.  
56 Hanson, supra note 15, at 4. 
57 Steven Finkbeiner, Bridging the Valley of Death of Therapeutics for Neurodegener -
ation, 16 NATURE MED. 1227, 1228 (2010).  
58 Nuala Moran, Public Sector Seeks to Bridge ‘Valley of Death’, 25 NATURE BIOTECH. 
266, 266 (2007).  
59 See Hanson, supra note 15, at 3. 
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undertake translational research, especially for rare diseases.60 Voluntary health 
organizations are one of the only organizations willing and able to fill these funding 
gaps.61  
III.  LEGAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE VENTURE PHILANTHROPY MODEL
“Historically, investigators would apply for a grant from a foundation or 
another funding organization and they’d get the grant, and there would 
be no oversight, no accountability for what happened with that money. All 
of that is changing.”
62
While disease advocacy groups are willing to help bioscience companies and 
academic researchers balance the risks of drug discovery, their support does not 
come without expectations.63 While venture philanthropy models vary among 
disease advocacy groups,64 they all utilize at least some venture capitalist tools to 
structure the partnerships. This section describes some of the tools used to structure 
the partnerships, examines the legal issues involved with one of these tools, 
discusses one social issue with venture philanthropy, and then concludes that despite 
these issues, the benefits of the model outweigh the negative issues.  
A.  Structuring the Partnership 
Venture philanthropy techniques can help disease advocacy groups achieve three 
objectives: control, return on investment, and information sharing. To maintain 
control of the research they fund, groups can contractually set milestones and 
termination rights, create price restrictions and distribution agreements, and 
negotiate for seats on a company’s boards of directors.65 To secure return on 
investment in order to fund future research, groups can contract for royalties, 
purchase direct equity in a company, or purchase debt in a company.66 Finally, to 
ensure information sharing in order to remove some of research impediments, 
groups can require assignment of patent rights, research tool sharing and patent 
pooling, and even provide access to disease advocacy group-controlled patient 
databases and bio-banks.67  
B.  Legal Issue: Seat on the Board of Directors 
While these techniques can help groups meet objectives, they are not without 
legal issues. This section will explore the issues presented by placing members of a 
                                                          
60 Hanson, supra note 15 at 3; Gambrill, supra note 18, at 1.  
61 Hanson, supra note 15, at 40; Gambrill, supra note 18, at 1. The National Institute of 
Health also provides considerable funding for disease research. Chang, supra note 45, at 14.
62 Quote by Linda Van Eldik, Professor in the Department of Cell and Molecular Biology 
at Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine. See Hanson, supra note 15, at 25.  
63 Gambrill, supra note 18, at 7.  
64 Gambrill, supra note 18, at 9-14. 
65 See Hanson, supra note at 15, at 27-35; Sievers, supra note 40, at 4; Letts, supra note 
38. 
66 See Hanson, supra note 15, at 27-35. 
67 Hanson, supra note 15, at 27-35. 
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disease advocacy group on a for-profit company’s board of directors. While legal 
issues can also arise with contracting for returns on investment,68 contracting with 
researchers to secure patent rights,69 and sharing patient databases or biobanks,70 an 
analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper.  
In venture capitalism, investors typically assume an ownership role by becoming 
actively engaged in the management of the company.71 This often entails taking seats 
on the company’s board of directors to help shape strategy, secure other investors, 
and steer policy.72 This control helps venture capitalists enhance the growth and 
sustainability of the investee company.73
“Based on this model, venture philanthropists are encouraged to become ‘highly 
engaged’ in the organizations to which they allocate their funds . . . ”74 As one 
scholar pointed out, this “raises sensitive issues of power and control.”75 This paper 
explores a director’s fiduciary duty of loyalty to a company and potential conflicts of 
interest that may arise when a member of a disease advocacy group takes a director 
position in a for-profit company. 
Directors of corporations owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its 
shareholders.76 One such fiduciary duty is the duty of loyalty, which requires 
                                                          
68 Hanson, supra note at 15, at 29. Foundations often believe they should receive a return 
on their investments. Hanson, supra note at 15, at 29. However, it can be difficult to determine 
what portion of the proceeds a particular organization should receive. Hanson, supra note 15, 
at 29. The time period between funding translational research and commercializing a drug 
may be years. Hanson, supra note 15, at 29. During that time, other investors or grantors may 
have contributed to the drug’s development. Hanson, supra note 15, at 29. Determining the 
proportion a particular organization should receive can be complex. Hanson, supra note 15, at 
29. According to Kenneth Schaner, a private practice attorney with extensive experience in 
venture philanthropy, the complexities of the issue often lead to many organizations forgoing 
attempts to recapture revenue. Hanson, supra note 15, at 29. 
69 See Stanford v. Roche, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011).  
70 See Hanson, supra note 15, at 42-44. The act of opening up patient databases and bio-
banks can raise issues about confidentiality, privacy, consent, and whether the researchers 
should share individual research results with tissue donors. Hanson, supra note at 15, at 42-44. 
Confidentiality is an issue because the identity of individuals can be identified from pooled 
genomic data. Hanson, supra note at 15, at 42-44. Legal and ethical questions can arise 
regarding whether patient consent was needed and obtained. Hanson, supra note at 15, at 42-
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supra note at 15, at 42-44..  
71 See Sievers, supra note 40, at 4.  
72 Sievers, supra note 40, at 4. 
73 See Letts, supra note 38.  
74 See Sievers, supra note 40, at 4. 
75 See Sievers, supra note 40, at 4 (focusing on the issues surrounding the inordinate 
influence of large donors on nonprofit organizational independence and the challenges that 
presents in a civil society).  
76 See, e.g., Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 
1986). 
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directors to refrain from self-dealing.77 This includes “refrain[ing] from doing 
anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit . . . ”78
Thus, directors may have an obligation to avoid conflicts of interests,79 and 
maximize shareholder returns on investments. 80  
Conflicts of interest can arise when a director has another interest that suggests 
divided loyalty between the corporation and another constituent.81 Generally, 
directors do not owe fiduciary duties to other constituencies whose rights are purely 
contractual.82 While many states have adopted “other constituencies” statutes that 
permit directors to consider the interests of non-shareholder constituencies in making 
corporate decisions, these statutes are only permissive, vary in the constituencies that 
are included, and are often vague as to how directors should weigh varying 
interests.83 These statutes do not seem to impact litigation outcomes84 and directors 
who favor another constituency over its shareholders can still violate their duty of 
loyalty.85  
Conflicts of interest, and violations of the duty of loyalty, can arise when venture 
capital managers serve as directors of companies because of divided loyalty between 
the venture capital firm and the investee company.86 Despite the fact that both parties 
typically want to maximize returns on investments,87 they nonetheless may face 
conflicting interests when, for example, decisions must be made on the terms and 
conditions to sell or merge the company.88  
                                                          
77 Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).  
78 Id. (emphasis added).  
79 See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).  
80 Shun Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: a Proposed Corporate 
Regime that Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 587, 591 
(1997).  
81 See Michael W. Peregrine & Robert A. Schreck, Jr., Managing Constituent Interests in 
Healthcare Joint Ventures, AHLA CONNECTIONS, Mar. 2012, at 1, http://www.mwe.com/files/ 
Publication/7ff5a67f-dac2-4494-b525-14842f7ed2fa/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ 
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82 See, e.g., Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. 1986).
83 Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee Governance, 30 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1227, 1230-41 (2004) (describing state constituency statues). 
84 Id.
85 Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 173 (Del. 1986) (hold-
ing that the Board of Directors breached their duty of loyalty due impermissibly considering 
noteholders’ interests at the expense of the shareholders). 
86 Jin-Kyu Koh & Theresa G. Carroll, Venture Capital Directors—The Heightened Risk of 
Serving More Than One Master, 28 MICH. BUS. L.J. 30, 31 (2008) (discussing potential 
conflict of interest situations for venture capital designated directors).  
87 John Dobson, Is Shareholder Wealth Maximization Immoral?, 55 FIN. ANALYST J. 69, 
69 (1999). 
88 Marc Weingarten & Neil P. Horne, Be Careful What You Wish For —Considerations 
When Obtaining Board Representation, ACTIVIST INVESTING DEV., Spring 2006, at 3, http:/ 
/www.srz.com/files/News/e5ecb0c3-7c98-40cc-baa9-febbd5e04eb6/Presentation/News 
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This Article argues that the risk of such conflicts of interest is heightened when a 
member of a disease advocacy group is placed on a for-profit company’s board of 
directors. While the board may have an obligation to maximize profits for the 
company and its shareholders,89 disease advocacy group members may want to 
pursue broader social values, such as maximizing drug distribution at minimized 
cost.  If conflicts arise, directors can be personally liable for the loss suffered by the 
corporation.90 Due to the inherent conflicts of interest and increased risk of liability, 
disease advocacy groups may want to forgo requests for board seats. 
While relinquishing board seats may be advisable, disease advocacy groups do 
not have to relinquish all influence over a board. For example, disease advocacy 
groups may still request board observation rights.91 Board observation rights provide 
individuals the right to attend and participate in board meetings, but not vote.92  
C.  Social Issue: Should Nonprofits be Making such Risky Investments?  
In addition to potential legal issues, the venture philanthropy business model also 
faces numerous social criticisms. One criticism is whether nonprofit organizations 
should want to emulate the poor success rates of venture capitalism.93 As one skeptic 
points out,  
venture capitalists themselves are fond of saying that of every 10 
investments, there will be 4 abject failures, 4 walking wounded, and 
maybe, if you are lucky, 1 or 2 real hits. Of course, in the financial world, 
the big hits make up for the dogs by returning huge profits, but we must 
ask whether this success rate is what we wish to emulate.94
The risk assumed by organizations adopting the venture philanthropy model can 
be understood by again examining the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation. While the 
Foundation was recently successful with the development of Kalydeco, they have 
experienced their share of failure from the high risks of such investment ventures. 
For example, in 2004-2005 alone, three relatively promising projects were 
terminated: Boehringer Ingelheim’s anti-inflammatory drug and Targeted Genetics' 
aerosol gene treatment were pulled from Phase II trials; and Amelubant, a 
rheumatoid arthritis drug also failed in trials.95 Additionally, in 2010, two 
                                                          
Attachment/862175d5-eedc-4f48-97cb-9117219a7cb5/filesfilesAI_spring06_beCarefulW 
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89 See Guth v. Loft, Inc. 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); Leung, supra note 80. 
90 See Koh & Carrol, supra note 86, at 30. Although state statutes can allow corporations 
to indemnify their board members for personal liability of a director for a breach of the 
director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) 
(2012).   
91 Koh & Carrol, supra note 86, at 32.  
92 Koh & Carrol, supra note 86, at 32.
93 See Sievers, supra note 40, at 2. 
94 See Sievers, supra note 40, at 2. 
95 Becky Jungbauer & Bridget Silverman, A Breath of Fresh Air for Cystic Fibrosis Drug 
Pipeline, 12 PHARM. APPROVAL MONTHLY 12 (Dec. 2007).  
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pharmaceutical companies that were partnering with the Foundation had insufficient 
capital to finish their projects, leading the Foundation to terminate the partnerships 
and establish new partnerships with other companies to continue the project.96 Such 
business decisions can cost companies support by investors and may have 
contributed to the Foundation’s Charity Navigator Rating to be decreased from a 4-
star to a 3-star rating in 2011.97  
D.  Despite these Concerns, Venture Philanthropy has Proven Its Value in 
Advancing Disease Research  
The venture philanthropy model’s ability to “de-risk” investments in order to 
spur private investment is precisely why the model was adopted by many disease 
advocacy groups in the first place. As Richard Insel, executive vice president of 
research at the Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation (JDRF), has stated: “[i]f we 
don’t take on risk as a foundation . . . nobody else is going to take it on . . . the 
obligation is on us to take on risk.”98 Many biotechnology companies have admitted 
that without the incentive of the venture philanthropy funding, their companies 
would never have invested in particular drug development research.99  
Because of this need, numerous large disease advocacy groups, including the 
Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation, the Michael J. Fox Foundation for 
Parkinson’s Research, the Prostate Cancer Foundation, and the Alzheimer’s Drug 
Discovery Foundation have adopted venture philanthropy business models in order 
to identify and fill gaps in particular disease research funding.100  Like the Cystic 
Fibrosis Foundation and Kalydeco, many of these organizations have experience 
drug development success.101 The Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation has drug 
therapies that have completed the entire cycle from laboratory research to the patient 
market,102 and all of the groups have numerous therapeutic drugs in the pipeline.103  
Additionally, money is not the only value that these organizations provide to 
their venture partners. According to Robert Gallotto, vice president of Altus 
Pharmaceuticals, “[c]apital is only one part of the equation. It’s much more the 
intellectual capital that was important for us.”104 Even if the public-private 
                                                          
96 See Potts, supra note 36, at 8-9.  
97 See Potts, supra note 36, at 9. 
98 See Hanson, supra note 15, at 14.  
99 Hanson, supra note 15, at 14.
100 See Potts, supra note 36, at 18.
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www.alzdiscovery.org/pdf/Pipeline_Report.pdf. 
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partnership does not result in the discovery of the targeted drug, the knowledge and 
research likely provides transparency to the public and investors on drug 
discovery.105  
IV.  INCENTIVIZING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR DISEASE RESEARCH
"Culture does not change because we desire to change it. Culture changes 
when the organization is transformed; the culture reflects the realities of 
people working together every day."
106
For all of the reasons stated above, partnerships between disease advocacy 
groups and commercial and academic researchers are worth incentivizing. This 
section proposes that changes to patent law could help reduce barriers to research on 
orphan drugs and incentivize many of these partnerships. This section then explores 
the use of priority review vouchers and concludes that such incentive mechanisms 
should not be employed for public policy reasons. Other ways to incentivize these 
partnerships could include funding research coalitions for disease research, creating 
an NIH task force to provide guidelines on the sharing of patient databases and 
biospecimen banks,107 reducing fees under the Prescription Drug User Fee Act and 
Orphan Drug Act, and changing the tax code to make it easier for disease advocacy 
groups to make riskier investments.108 But, these potential incentives are beyond the 
scope of this paper.   
                                                          
105 For example, the Alzheimer’s Drug Discovery Foundation measures its impacts by 
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taxes of Chapter 42 to curb perceived abusive behavior by foundations. One of the most 
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4944 Excise taxes are imposed under this section not only on the private foundations but also 
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2013).  
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A.  Patent Law 
“In today’s research environment, it is virtually impossible for 
researchers to identify a drug candidate without using some patented 
invention they do not own.”
109
Under federal law, a patent owner has the right to sue anyone who utilizes her 
patented invention without permission.110 While patents may provide incentives for 
developing new technologies, they constrain access to those technologies, which can 
inhibit research and the development of needed therapies.111 Two statutory and 
common law exceptions do exist that shield researchers from patent liability in 
narrow instances: the safe harbor provision under 35 USC §271(e)(1) and the 
common law research exception.112 Unfortunately, judicial limitations to these 
provisions have created restrictions and ambiguity regarding their applicability to 
research funded by disease advocacy groups in conjunction with for-profit 
bioscience companies.  
In order to get around these ambiguities, some groups are contractually creating 
“biomedical research commons,” where patented inventions are available to 
noncommercial researchers.113 However, private ordering does not go far enough; as 
described above, many “noncommercial” researchers are often now affiliated with 
commercial bioscience companies. This section examines the current state of the 
patent law and proposes Congressional amendments to remove impediments to 
research on rare or orphan diseases, which would help encourage partnerships 
between disease advocacy groups and the private sector.  
1.  Common Law Experimental Research Exception 
Under the common law, the use of a patented invention for research purposes, 
and using research tools in drug delivery, was not considered infringement.114
Whether the research exception could be used as a defense to patent infringement, 
however, depended on whether the person had an intention of gaining financially 
from the endeavor or if there was some commercial benefit.115 If the person gained 
financially or commercially, then the exception generally did not apply.116 Thus, the 
research exception was not available to pharmaceutical companies, even when they 
were seeking FDA approval for generic drugs.117  
                                                          
109 Nyffeler, supra note 26, at 1046-47.   
110 35 U.S.C. §271 (West 2012). 
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Until 2002, universities and other nonprofits were believed to be immune from 
patent infringement liability under the experimental use defense.118 The Federal 
Circuit in Madey v. Duke University disagreed.119 In Madey, the court held that 
research conducted at major research universities, such as Duke University, did not 
fall under the experimental use exception.120 They explained that the exception only 
narrowly covers research performed “for amusement . . . idle curiosity, or for strictly 
philosophical inquiry.”121 Thus, the exception is not limited to endeavors for 
commercial gain, but also extends to research that furthers the alleged infringer’s 
legitimate business.122 While major universities fund many research projects with no 
commercial application, the research nonetheless furthers the institution’s legitimate 
business objectives, including education, increasing institutional status, and 
attracting research grants, students, and faculty.123 The fact that universities may be 
non-profit institutions “is not determinative.”124  
In effect, Madey disqualified all research universities and nonprofit research 
institutions from the experimental use defense.125 Thus, it is highly unlikely that 
most drug development ventures between disease advocacy groups and for-profit 
bioscience companies could invoke the common law research exception if they 
infringed on a patented invention in the course of drug discovery. Under the new 
venture philanthropy model, these non-profits have become more commercial in 
nature. Additionally, funding disease research furthers their legitimate business 
objectives of finding cures for diseases, which can attract additional donors and 
federal grants. While disease advocacy groups are still funding basic research, that 
research is often directed at academic researchers,126 who are similarly not covered 
under the exception. Finally, while some disease advocacy groups have contracted to 
provide drugs to patients in certain geographic or socio-economic spheres at no 
profit, some of the drugs are still sold to the public for profit.127
Denying the experimental research defense to universities and nonprofit 
institutions could have a chilling effect on basic research.128 In theory, research will 
cost more and potentially even be slowed as institutions will have to devote more 
resources to costly patent searches, negotiate for patent licenses, and pay more due to 
royalty stacking of downstream discoveries through reach-through licenses.129 While 
                                                          
118 See Michelle Cai, Madey v. Duke University: Shattering the Myth of Universities’ 
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one scholar questions whether commercial patent holders will actively exert their 
patent rights against universities,130 the new partnerships structured under the 
venture philanthropy model may be more targeted due to their commercial 
objectives.  
2.  Statutory Safe Harbor Provision 
In 1984, Congress passed 35 USC §271(e)(1), often referred to as the safe harbor 
provision, to allow an exception to infringement if the research was “reasonably 
related to the development and submission of information” to the FDA.131 The 
original intent of this law was to shield drug makers from patent infringement claims 
during generic drug development, since they did not fall under the common law 
research use exception, while having minimal impacts on patent law. 132 However, 
the language of the statute does not limit it to generic drugs.133 Thus, the Supreme 
Court has interpreted the safe harbor exemption broadly134  
In particular, in 2005 in Merck v. Integra, the Court held that the statute covered 
not only generic pharmaceutical drugs for which an IND was submitted, but “all uses 
of patented inventions that are reasonably related to the development and submission 
of any information under the FDCA.”135 Thus, Merck extended the exception to pre-
clinical research where a 
drugmaker has a reasonable basis for believing that a patented compound 
may work, through a particular biological process, to produce a particular 
physiological effect, and uses the compound in research that if successful, 
would be appropriate to include in a submission to the FDA, that use is 
‘reasonably related’ to the development and submission of information 
under . . . Federal law.’136  
However, the Court instructed that the safe harbor exception does not apply to 
[b]asic scientific research on a particular compound, performed without 
the intent to develop a particular drug or a reasonable belief that the 
compound will cause the sort of physiological effect the researcher 
intends to induce . . . [be it would not be] ‘reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information’ to the FDA.137
Thus, the safe harbor exception should at least begin at the drug optimization 
stage, when a drug maker would have both the intent to make a drug and a 
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reasonable belief that the compound analyzed would act in the desired manner.138
However, it is more uncertain whether the safe harbor exception would apply if one, 
but not both, exceptions were met.139 For example, it is uncertain whether  the 
exception would apply to the screening stage of drug development where a 
researcher has the “intent to develop a particular drug” for FDA approval but may 
lack a “reasonable belief” that the compounds she is testing will cause the 
“physiological effect the research intends to induce.”140 If screening were included 
under this exception, then the safe harbor exception would encompass virtually all of 
the drug discovery process.141  
As one author eloquently stated “the failure of the legislature and judiciary to 
adequately define significant terms regarding the §271(e)(1) safe harbor exemption 
has resulted in a governmentally fashioned state of confusion. Within the arena of 
drug discovery and biotechnology there is no precise determination of where 
infringement stops and exemption begins.” 142 Neither the Supreme Court nor the 
Federal Circuit has clarified this issue.143 This is problematic, as uncertainty in this 
area could have a chilling effect on drug development, especially due to the threat of 
treble damages for findings of willful infringement.144  
3.  A Proposal for Broader Experimental Use and Safe Harbor Exceptions for 
Orphan Drug Development
Scholars and judges have advocated for both broader experimental use 
exceptions and clarification of safe harbor exceptions.145 One scholar suggested that 
allowing the experimental use exception may be justified in areas where patent 
exclusion causes socially harmful results; however, where and who draws the line 
between exempted and non-exempted research?146 While funding agencies, such as 
the National Institute of Health (NIH), could be used to draw such a line, they might 
not be in any better position than the courts.147 Others have proposed bright-line or 
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categorical rules such as eliminating the experimental use defense for universities 
entirely,148 or amending §271(e)(1) to state that the safe harbor exemption does not 
apply to research tools,149 or is limited to the development of generic drugs.150
This paper combines both of these ideas into the following proposal: Congress 
should statutorily extend the experimental use and safe harbor exceptions to orphan 
drug research. Thus, basic research on orphan diseases undertaken by academic and 
nonprofit organizations would once again be shielded from patent infringement 
liability. Perhaps more importantly, it would help reduce the economic risk of early 
translational research, which may or may not be covered under the Court’s 
interpretation of the safe harbor provision in Merck. This proposal would be both 
easy to implement while providing the proper balance between encouraging orphan 
drug research and upholding strong patent rights in commercial drug development.  
First, this proposal would be relatively easy to implement. It creates a clear 
categorical exception since “orphan disease” is statutorily defined under the Orphan 
Drug Act as “a disease or condition that affects fewer than 200,000 people in the 
United States.”151 In close cases, organizations could potentially submit 
documentation that the proposed target population being researched involves fewer 
than 200,000 people in the United States to a review agency, such as the FDA, to 
receive designation status.152 The FDA could maintain a public database of all 
diseases that have received orphan disease status.153  
It would also be easy to identify the individuals conducting orphan disease 
research. In order to gain funding, scientists must typically claim some practical 
implications for their research, such as finding a cure for a particular disease.154
Since many disease advocacy groups encourage or contractually require public 
dissemination of research findings supported by their funding,155 individual scientists 
or organizations engaged in research on a particular disease may be identifiable. 
Also most orphan diseases have a genetic component,156 which may make it possible 
to determine exactly what disease or variant is being researched if issues arise.  
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Second, this proposal strikes the proper balance between encouraging orphan 
drug research and upholding strong patent rights in commercial drug development. 
The proposal would be consistent with government policy for encouraging orphan 
drug research. For example, over the last 30 years, Congress has enacted numerous 
statutes, including the Orphan Drug Act157 and the Rare Disease Act of 2002158 in an 
effort to reduce the barriers to such research. Even agencies have sought novel 
solutions, such as NIH’s Office of Rare Disease Research,159 and the FDA’s recent 
launch of its Rare Disease Repurposing Database, which is meant to encourage 
venture investing into orphan drugs.160  
The benefits derived from such a narrow amendment to patent law would 
outweigh any negative impacts. Opponents of expanding experimental use or safe 
harbor exemptions express concern that drug researchers would no longer receive 
compensation for the patented research tools that they invented.161 Additionally, if 
patent protection in drug development was eroded, it could lead to a decrease in 
venture capital investments in biotechnology companies because many of the 
intellectual property assets generated would essentially be worthless.162 This would 
in turn reduce the development of new research tools, which would hurt the overall 
pharmaceutical industry.163  However, the narrowness of this proposal should help 
alleviate most of those concerns; in most cases, with the exception of orphan drug 
research, patent protection would remain unchanged. Thus, orphan drug research 
could progress without some intellectual property impediments, but patent holders 
would still derive monetary benefit from most bioscience industry research.164
B.  Priority Review Vouchers 
Priority review vouchers appear popular with Congress for the issue of rare and 
neglected diseases. This section describes the Priority Review Voucher program and 
argues that the program should not be expanded for public policy reasons.  
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On September 27, 2007, the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 
2007 (FDAAA) was signed into law.165 The Act included Section 1102, which added 
new section 524 to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 360n).166
Section 524 authorizes the FDA to award a priority review voucher (“PRV”) to 
sponsors of drugs or vaccines for certain tropical diseases upon approval of the 
tropical disease product application.167 A PRV entitles the holder to obtain priority 
review for any new future drug application that would not otherwise quality for 
priority review.168 A PRV can be used by the sponsor who obtains it or may be 
transferred or sold to another party.169 By enacting Section 524, Congress sought to 
“stimulate new drug development by offering additional incentives for obtaining 
FDA approval of certain tropical disease drug products.”170
Proponents for PVRs argue that they are “a powerful new incentive” for 
companies to invest in the treatment of tropical diseases. 171 A voucher could be 
worth $50-500 million,172 and the benefits derived could include reducing FDA 
review by four to 12 months and allowing for earlier market entry, which could give 
a company greater advantage over competition.173  
Enamored by the possibilities of these new vouchers, in March 2011, four 
senators cosponsored a bipartisan bill, the Creating Hope Act of 2011, which would 
amend the FDC Act § 524 to expand the priority review voucher program to include 
rare pediatric diseases.174 The bill was designed to “encourage the development of 
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treatments for children with serious rare diseases.”175 In September 2011, the House 
introduced a companion bill.176 The President signed the Creating Hope Act of 2011 
into law on July 9, 2012.177
In theory, it would be possible to expand PVRs to encompass all orphan diseases. 
However, this Article argues that while PVRs have much appeal, they present 
numerous public policy issues that outweigh their value. First, while the vouchers 
have received much attention and support for helping to spur research and 
innovation, at writing, the FDA has only issued a single PRV since the program 
began in 2007,178 begging the question of whether they are in fact incentivizing 
research.  
Second, the program invokes many concerns such as: whether the vouchers could 
slow the review of other drugs;179 whether such drugs will ever reach the intended 
affected population since the program does not require sponsors to have secured a 
manufacturer willing to produce them;180 and whether a drug subjected to priority 
review could pose greater safety risks due to faster reviews.181  This Article will 
explore the first issue.182 In particular, Congress needs to consider whether we want 
to prioritize drugs that should never have priority in the first place, especially when it 
may slow down priority review for other much needed drugs. An FDA priority 
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review designation “was meant to shorten the review time of products that represent 
major advances in treatment or that treat conditions for which no adequate therapy 
exists, such as certain types of cancer and infection with the human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV).”183 For such treatments, priority review is 
reasonable.184 However, under the voucher program, drugs “for which there is little 
or no clinical urgency [may] be subject to accelerated deadlines . . . ”185 In order to 
analyze those drugs more quickly, the FDA must employ additional resources.186  
Proponents of the program have argued that the costs of those additional 
resources are recovered through the special user fee that must be paid by the 
company that uses the PRV for one of its products.187 With the user fee, proponents 
argue that it should not be necessary for the FDA to slow other drugs awaiting 
approval.188  While this argument appears convincing, its proponents fail to consider 
the realities of government appropriations and the risk that system presents.  
Under the PRV program, the special user fees collected each year are deposited 
and credited as offsetting collections to the account providing appropriations to the 
Food and Drug Administration.189 Offsetting collections are authorized to be credited 
to the account from which they will be spent at the program or account level, and 
remain there until expended.190 However, offsetting collections can encourage 
appropriations committees to reduce spending.191 This is because “[u]nder current 
scorekeeping rules, a committee that cuts spending in a program gets credit for the 
savings (and an increase in offsetting collections is treated as a decrease in 
spending).”192 Thus, large influxes of money from the PRV special user fees could 
result in additional cuts to FDA appropriations. This is problematic. The 2012 State 
of the FDA identified agency funding as the greatest threat to the FDA’s future.193 In 
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FY 12, the agency received only a small increase in appropriated funding, and FDA 
faces potential cuts in FY 13.194  
Additionally, Congressional mandates and amendments to the user fee 
reauthorization legislation will impose new unfunded requirements on the agency 
beyond what will be paid for by user fees.195 Thus, FDA employees will already be 
overextended; a large influx of PRVs would only compound this problem, even if 
sponsors must pay a special user fee. This could result in slower priority review 
times and delay in getting life-saving drugs into the market.  
V.  WHEN A NEW DRUG IS DISCOVERED, SHOULD DISEASE ADVOCACY GROUPS 
CONTROL PRICING AND ACCESS? 
“The intention of orphan drug legislation . . . is to make the development 
of drugs for orphan diseases profitable. The unintended consequence is 
exploitation of the rules for profit. Like tax avoidance, this is legal, but 
not necessarily desirable.”
196
As discussed above, the new drugs developed through public-private partnerships 
could significantly improve the lives of many people.197 However, there is concern 
that the drugs will be unaffordable and inaccessible to many people suffering from 
diseases.198 This section explores that issue and suggests that disease advocacy 
groups partnering with for-profit bioscience companies should try to contract for 
patient drug access using a tiered pricing system. 
A.  Orphan Drugs can be Expensive and May Not be Accessible to Everyone Affected 
by the Disease 
Orphan drugs are some of the most expensive drugs in the world, costing as 
much as $400,000 per year per individual.199 Many of the costs of developing a new 
drug are incurred regardless of the target population size.200 Thus, companies argue 
that they must set high prices to recover drug development costs and make a 
profit.201 Due to the market exclusivity provisions of the Orphan Drug Act, there 
may be only one drug on the market to treat the disease;202 however, people are often 
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2013] FINDING A CURE 309 
willing to pay high prices, and insurance companies lack leverage to negotiate lower 
prices.203  
Even after patent and market exclusivity ends, orphan drugs face less price 
competition than nonorphan drugs.204 For nonorphan drugs, generic drug 
competition will often drive down drug prices within six to twelve months of generic 
market entry.205 However, fewer generic drugs are available for orphan diseases, in 
part, due to the small market potential.206 Even when a generic is developed, it may 
only charge a slightly lower price (e.g. 15% less) than the brand-name drug.207
Substantial price drops for nonorphan drugs typically only occur once additional 
generic competitors enter the market.208 However, the development of multiple 
generic drugs for orphan diseases is less likely, resulting in overall limited price 
competition.209 For these reasons, orphan drugs have monopolistic power, leading to 
their high prices.210 Thus, despite small markets, orphan drugs can be very 
profitable,211 and even result in “blockbuster orphans.”212  
In one sense, the intention of the Orphan Drug Act has worked; financial 
incentives now exist for companies to develop treatments for rare disorders,213
companies are able to make profits on orphan drugs, and there have been over 350 
orphan drugs approved by the FDA since the Act was enacted in 1983.214
Unfortunately, companies seemed to have exploited the system,215 and the rationales 
commonly cited for high prices may not apply to all drugs. For example, although 
companies often cite high research and development costs as a motivating factor in 
the high pricing of orphan drugs, the argument does not apply to all orphan drugs. 
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As described above, many orphan drugs are repurposed drugs that had already 
received FDA approved for another use. In these instances, the research and 
development costs are substantially less.216  
Additionally, marketing costs for orphan diseases should be substantially lower 
than non-orphan drugs, since target populations are small.217 Furthermore, disease 
advocacy groups are generally active in informing those afflicted by the disease of 
new treatments, which can decrease marketing costs.218
The high prices of many orphan drugs have very real consequences: the drugs 
may be unaffordable, and thus unavailable, for many people afflicted by rare 
diseases.219 Many individuals lack health insurance coverage and would be unable to 
afford such high costs on their own.220 Individuals that seek coverage after being 
diagnosed with a disease have historically found it difficult to obtain insurance at all, 
let alone affordable insurance.221 Finally, even if an individual has health insurance, 
many plans may cover the drugs but require substantial patient cost sharing.222 These 
same people may then be without coverage when treatment costs exceed their plan’s 
lifetime cap or drive premiums unaffordably high.223  
B.  Public-private Partnership Contracts for Tiered Pricing Systems are a Good 
Mechanism to Control Orphan Drug Prices  
The issue of affordability and orphan drugs has attracted considerable 
attention.224Aside from federal price controls, numerous arguments have been made 
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that the drug industry should at least be encouraged to make drugs for rare diseases 
reflect value based pricing.225 At least one scholar as suggested that public-private 
partnerships could be one mechanism for making drugs more affordable.226 This 
Article expands on that idea and proposes that drug advocacy groups, when 
partnering with commercial and academic researchers, should attempt to contract for 
tiered-pricing structures that could allow public companies to make a profit while 
also making drugs available to people unable to pay.227 In the context of drug 
products, tiered pricing is a mechanism that adapts a product’s price to the 
purchasing power of consumers in different geographical or socio-economic 
segments.228  
There are at least three recent examples of how public entities have controlled the 
prices of therapies developed in conjunction with private sector companies, two of 
which have used tiered pricing mechanisms in an attempt to provide affordable 
therapies for patients. The first partnership involves the state of California. In 2005, 
the state of California established the California Institute for Regenerative Medicine 
(CIRM) through a state-wide ballot measure.229 The measure provided over $3 
billion for stem cell research and allowed CIRM to allocate the money through 
grants and loans.230  These grants and loans are governed by numerous regulations, 
some of which helped to ensure that Californians pay a fair price for drugs they 
helped create. 231  For example, CIRM requires that for-profit grantees must submit a 
plan on how uninsured Californians would access a drug produced wholly or partly 
from CIRM-funded research.232 Furthermore, the drug must be sold at a price 
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provided for under the California Discount Prescription Drug Program.233 The need 
for tiered pricing formulas has also been examined.234  
The second example involves a partnership between the Drugs for Neglected 
Diseases Initiative, a non-profit research and development organization, and the 
world’s third largest pharmaceutical company, Sanofi-Aventis.235 In 2004, the 
partnership was formed in order to develop a fixed-dose anti-malarial drug.236 As 
part of the agreement, Sanofi-Aventis agreed not to seek patent protection on the 
drug and to sell it at cost to public health organizations.237 In early 2007, the 
partnership launched its first anti-malarial drug.238 As of 2010, over 80 million 
treatments had been purchased and the drug was registered in 30 sub-Saharan 
African countries and in India.239 The wide success and availability of the drug is 
due, in part, to a tiered-pricing policy.240 The tiered pricing policy allows for “no 
profit-no loss” pricing for the drug in the public sectors, including governments and 
non-profit NGOs.241 The same drug is then also sold in the private sector under a 
different brand name at market prices to allow for profit margins.242 Thus, the public 
sector pays less than $1 for adults and $0.50 for children per day, while the brand 
name drug is sold for $2-3 to wholesalers that supply the private market.243  
The third example involves the partnership between the Cystic Fibrosis 
Foundation and Vertex Pharmaceuticals, which produced the drug Kalydeco, 
described above. While a year’s supply of the drug will cost $294,000, Vertex has 
agreed to provide the medicine for free to people with no insurance and with 
household incomes of $150,000 or less.244 Furthermore, the company will cover 30 
percent of co-pay costs for select patients who have insurance.245
As demonstrated above, tiered pricing systems have been successful, at least in 
some cases, in lessening at least one of the barriers to drug access−drug pricing.246
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Thus, disease advocacy groups should consider the use of price control mechanisms 
when forming partnerships with commercial and academic researchers. However, the 
ability of disease advocacy groups to secure such contractual price controls may 
depend on their ability to derisk the venture, which may depend on the amount of 
initial funding, likelihood of future funding, their ability to provide access to patients 
for clinical trials, their ability to reduce marketing and advertising costs through 
access to patient registries, the potential market size for the drug, and the availability 
of orphan drug tax credits and market exclusivity. 
VI.  CONCLUSION
In conclusion, partnerships between disease advocacy groups and commercial 
and academic researchers present exciting new possibilities for drug development, 
including the development of orphan drugs. This paper advocates for Congress to 
support these new partnerships by amending the patent law to create a federally 
sanctioned “biomedical patent commons” for orphan disease research. Congress 
should not continue to expand the Priority Review Voucher program due to the 
negative impacts that it could have on the priority review process and overall agency 
funding. Finally, when disease advocacy groups do partner with bioscience 
companies, tiered pricing systems appear to be a goodway to ensure that people 
unable to pay for therapies can nonetheless gain access to them.  
 
